Rectification of Preferences in a Fuzzy Environment. by Franco de los Ríos, Camilo A. et al.
E. Hüllermeier, R. Kruse, and F. Hoffmann (Eds.): IPMU 2010, Part I, CCIS 80, pp. 168–178, 2010. 
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 
Rectification of Preferences in a Fuzzy Environment 
Camilo A. Franco de los Ríos, Javier Montero, and J. Tinguaro Rodríguez 
Faculty of Mathematics, Complutense University, Madrid 28040, Spain 
francodelosrios@gmail.com 
Abstract.  In this paper we consider a complete fuzzy preference structure, de-
fined by means of a constructive approach associated to the necessary learning 
process in a decision making problem. Preference relations are successively  
assigned over a given set of alternatives with the possibility of revision and rec-
tification, subject to a certain set of beliefs which sustain the construction of 
different viewpoints.  Measures of information are then considered in this proc-
ess for a formal identification of uncertainty due to ignorance, a concept that is 
closely related to ambiguity as defined by Fishburn (1993).  Finally, a coher-
ence criterion is proposed in order to study the importance of preferences, in 
such a way that an indirect and comparative analysis between them is needed so 
outcomes may be coherently organized. 
Keywords: fuzzy preferences, rectification, beliefs, viewpoints, uncertainty due 
to ignorance, ambiguity, coherence measures. 
1   Introduction 
Different notions of preference can be established between distinct classes of entities, 
actions, circumstances or propositions, in order to understand how decision makers 
view the world and its inherent uncertainty.  Within this vision, motivated by a sub-
jective vision over classical logic [6], the set of possible worlds is viewed as a subset 
of alternatives, in such a way that preferences are stated on the basis of individual or 
collective beliefs towards a certain subset of alternatives, taking into account positive 
and negative arguments for each comparison.  In particular, the base of beliefs, a set 
of formulas where each formula represents an individual belief, delimits the set of 
possible worlds in such a way that any added belief will impossible worlds be re-
jected.  It is out of question the importance of opening the possibility of revision and 
rectification of these beliefs, since it is a primary learning characteristic of any intelli-
gent system [18].   
In this article the concept of fuzzy environment is supported from a constructive 
approach providing the setting for fuzzy logic and its applications.  In this case, the 
field of application is preference theory, considering the construction of a preference 
order, according to a characteristic viewpoint, under uncertainty due to ignorance or 
ambiguity. The distinction that we follow here is the one that almost a century ago 
(1921) Knight [15] and Keynes [14] presented between measurable uncertainty (prob-
abilities) and unmeasurable uncertainty (weight of evidence), arguing that ambiguity, 
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understood as lack of knowledge [7], [8], has an important role in rational learning 
and decision processes.      
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the key aspects of uncer-
tainty due to ignorance and reviews ambiguity and coherence as information meas-
ures.  In section 3, a complete preference structure is defined under characteristic 
viewpoints. Finally, section 4 examines the possibility of rectification in a decision 
process with fuzzy preference relations, where information measures have the main 
function of preserving coherence when knowledge is ambiguous. 
2   Uncertainty and Ignorance 
The search for alternative qualitative and symbolic models is extremely relevant for a 
further development of preference theory, in order to complement, explain and gener-
alize the classical body of knowledge founded in the theory of (expected) utility.  Di-
verse studies in social sciences (see [7], [10]) where the problem of decision under 
ignorance is examined according to the approach formulated in [14] and [15], offer 
some experimental evidence supporting that preferences do not depend only on the 
degree of uncertainty over the quality of information, but also over its source.  This 
distinction motivates a careful study of uncertainty, stressing the relationship of the 
concept of ignorance with ambiguity [8] and fuzziness [24], different to probabilistic 
uncertainty. 
To illustrate the idea stated above we recall the classical example of the “two col-
ors” (see [7], [14], [15]).  Consider two boxes containing red and black balls.  The 
first box contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls, while the second box has 100 black 
and red balls without known proportion.  Although most decision makers will assign 
the same probability of reaching for a red ball in any of the boxes (0.5), the weight of 
the argument in favour of this conclusion is greater in the first case than in the second 
one.  The fact that in general people prefer to bet for the box with known proportion, 
suggests that subjective probabilities of reaching for a red or black ball are greater in 
the box where its proportion is known, revealing a behavioural pattern not fully con-
sistent with standard subjective probability and expected utility theory.  
As shown in [7], there is a pronounced difference between the type of uncertainty 
that can be measured by probabilistic functions, which can be referred to as risk, and 
the type that can not be directly measured by such functions.  So, in the presence of 
uncertainty we have the probability of occurrence of an event, and on the other hand, 
a degree of confidence over the different attributes of information. Decisions rest 
upon beliefs about the state of nature in situations where non probabilistic uncertainty 
is present.  In common human decision making, for example, it is clear that probabil-
istic reasoning gets less weight, since quite often we process mixtures of different 
kinds of uncertainties (this is the case, for example, of most statistical polls, as soon 
as they make use of linguistic terms that should bring a specialized non probabilistic 
analysis).   
Restricting ourselves to non probabilistic uncertainty, in particular to a state of 
knowledge of the decision maker that can be referred to as uncertainty due to igno-
rance, we realize that such ambiguity affects decisions in a way that contradicts addi-
tivity of subjective probability.  To clarify this idea we remind below the definition of 
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ambiguity [8] and study its relation with fuzziness [24], in order to represent decision 
situations where the boundary between the set of possible and impossible worlds, 
constructed upon beliefs that support a finite set of viewpoints, is not always crisp. 
Ambiguity, as a primitive concept, has been proposed as a comparative relation 
on a set of elements X where P(X) is the set of all subsets of X.  The set measure 
α:P(X)→[0,1] is called an ambiguity function if it satisfies the following three  
axioms [8]: 
A1. α(∅)=0  
A2. α(A)=α(Ac)  
A3. α(A∪B) + α(A∩B) ≤ α(A) + α(B) 
Minimum ambiguity is assigned to the null set, such that α(∅)=α(X)=0.  The 
complement of A is denoted by Ac, so the central idea of this characterization is 
expressed by (A2), where ambiguity is a measure of a certain attribute of information 
shared by any set A and its complementation.  Let us remind that for probabilities, if p 
stands for a probability function, p(A)+p(Ac)=1, while for ambiguity, α(A)=α(Ac), 
reflecting the original intuition [8] that whatever underlies the ambiguity of a set also 
underlies the ambiguity of its complement. Finally, the third axiom expresses 
submodularity: the idea that the union of two sets A, B may reduce or cancel 
ambiguities associated to each one (considered separately), in such a way that if A and 
B are disjoint, then α(A∪B)≤α(A)+α(B) and if α(A∪B)=X then α(A∩B)≤α(A)+α(B). 
The above idea of ambiguity measures can be translated into fuzzy set theory [25].  
Fuzzy logic focuses on situations where the boundary between the set of possible and 
impossible worlds is not always crisp, and a fuzzy subset R may be naturally de-
scribed by the membership and non-membership degree of each element x in X, de-
noted by R+(x) and R-(x) respectively.  As suggested in [24], fuzziness may rise from 
the lack of an absolute distinction between R+ and R-.  Note that R- does not necessar-
ily correspond to the classical conception of complementation, since (see for example 
[2], [16], [19]) non-membership intensities can be better understood as some kind of 
orthogonal but positively measurable degrees over the elements of X.  A more de-
tailed study on fuzziness and its different interpretations for fuzzy sets ([25], [26]) and 
intuitionistic fuzzy sets [2] can be found in [22]. 
Following [24], where R- is taken as the complement in such a way that R-
(x)=Rc(x)=1-R(x), if we assume that R is a fuzzy subset defined over the finite set X 
with cardinality n, the intersection of R+(x) and R-(x) is defined by the set I(x), 
I=R+∩R- (see [4] in order to stress the relevance of the related concept of overlapping 
when dealing with fuzzy information).  As a result, if the set I(x) is empty, then 
R+ and R- are clearly distinct and no fuzziness occurs (membership intensities are ei-
ther 0 or 1) but when I(x) is positive, the larger it becomes, the greater the fuzziness 
associated with the set R. 
Let us remind the formal characterization of measures of fuzziness, Fuzz(R), for 
any fuzzy subset R (see [24]): 
F1.  Fuzz(R)=0 if and only if R is a crisp subset. 
F2.  Fuzz(R) has its maximal defined as R(x)=0.5 for all x.  
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F3.  For any fuzzy subset R* such that R*(x)≥R(x) if R(x)≥0.5 and R*(x)≤R(x) if 
R(x)≤0.5 then Fuzz(R)≥Fuzz(R*): R* is called a sharpened version of R. 
As shown in [24], a measure of fuzziness can be also an ambiguity measure in the 
sense of Fishburn [8], where R(x)∪S(x)=max(R(x),S(x)), R(x)∩S(x)=min(R(x),S(x)) 
and Rc(x)=1-R(x) for any fuzzy sets R and S.  As a consequence, ambiguity measures 
are also valid for measuring fuzziness. 
Once the concept of uncertainty due to ignorance has been associated to the con-
cept of ambiguity and fuzziness, we can analyze its role in a preference ordering con-
struction process. Usually preference evaluation vía binary relations considers only 
the two alternatives at stake and their principal attributes, paying less attention to sec-
ond order characteristics, which receive greater relevance in situations where ambigu-
ity is present.  For this reason we need to analyze the different states of knowledge 
(from absolute certainty to total ignorance) of a decision maker.   
A comparative analysis should allow us to distinguish between different states of 
knowledge, judging the set of constructed preferences based on expert knowledge or 
maximal certainty.  In consequence, diverse attributes may receive positive and higher 
values of relevance in a comparative evaluation than in an isolated one. In order to 
study the importance of preference relations and their outcomes, it is necessary to 
remind some basic definitions and introduce a preference structure within a fuzzy 
environment.      
3   Complete Preference Structure 
A decision making problem is here understood as the construction of an ordering 
process over a finite set of alternatives A, where fuzzy binary relations are defined 
between alternatives a and b by a degree of truth for the predicate R, “a is at least as 
good as b”, assigned according to a complete and partially ordered valuation set L. 
Following standard approaches (see [9], [17]), each fuzzy preference relation R can be 
understood as a composition of four different relations and its corresponding intensi-
ties. These components are “strict preference of a over b”: P, “strict preference of b 
over a”: P-1, “indifference between a and b”: I, and “incomparability between a and 
b”: J.    
A fuzzy preference binary relation for a set of alternatives A is characterized by a 
complete valuation space L and a function R such that :R A A L× → .  For simplicity, 
we consider the case in which L=[0,1].  Here we consider the three axioms proposed in 
[9] and [17].  The “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” axiom states that for every 
pair of alternatives a, b, the values of P(a,b), I(a,b) and J(a,b) depend only on the values 
of x=R(a,b) and y=R(b,a).  The existence of the continuous functions,  
[ ] [ ]2, , : 0,1 0,1p i j →  
can be stated, in such a way that P(a,b)=p(x,y), I(a,b)=i(x,y) and J(a,b)=j(x,y).  The 
“Positive Association” axiom says that functions p(x,n(y)), i(x,y) and j(n(x),n(y))  
are non-decreasing over both arguments. The “Symmetry” axiom states the symmetry 
of the functions i(x,y) and j(x,y).  The complete preference structure is therefore  
described as: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , ,R x y p x y p y x i x y j x y=   (1) 
where R(x,y)≥1. In this way, the aggregated intensity is being decomposed into four 
intensities that should cover the total possible intensity.    
In order to build up the relation R over the available alternatives, a rational process 
is needed to identify viewpoint h H∈ , under which preferences can be valued.  The 
principle of rationality that we follow here is the one of minimum action, where an 
individual searches for the viewpoint with lowest dimension (minimal number of cri-
teria) so a consistent preference ordering can be constructed for a finite subset of al-
ternatives.  For an exploration of different approaches to dimension for some classes 
of orders see for example [12]. 
Each viewpoint h is constructed over the attributes of the available information on 
the elements of the set A, interpreted according to the base of beliefs B, over which 
the set of criteria C can be defined.  Here h represents an independent state of mind 
for undertaking the preference analysis. The following definition is based on [13]: 
Definition. A viewpoint h H∈  for a subset of alternatives hS A⊆  is characterized 
by an outcome space Ωh, a set of criteria Ch where each criterion ch:Sh→ Ωh maps al-
ternatives to their outcomes, and a partial order given by the set of fuzzy preference 
relations R over Ωh.  
The set of criteria Ch is a finite set whose elements can be combined for the con-
struction of any viewpoint h H∈ , where each criterion determines a new dimension 
for the outcome space Ωh.  
Differences between viewpoints ,h v H∈  over the same set of alternatives S, case 
where Sh=Sv, may refer to differences in preferences, in outcome spaces or in criteria 
[3], [13]. If a set of alternatives S is organized by a unique viewpoint h, we say it is 
the characterizing viewpoint of S, denoted by Sh. If more viewpoints are candidates 
for ordering the same set S, then we say that a process of rectification is possible. 
Rectification allows the identification of a new order on the alternatives in S, reveal-
ing a change in the preferences of the decision maker. When an intelligent agent recti-
fies, a new viewpoint is being searched.  This is a task where the decomposition or 
combination of viewpoints may be necessary. Therefore, two viewpoints can be com-
bined or decomposed for constructing a new enlarged or reduced viewpoint, where 
the set of alternatives, preferences, outcome spaces or criteria may change. Still, 
maximum coherence needs to be preserved. 
The complete structure for this preference constructive approach can now be de-
fined as, 
, , ,Z A H R L=  
where H is the set of all possible viewpoints under which the alternatives in A can be 
completely ordered according to the structure given by R and its valuation set L.   
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4   Information Measures and Preference Rectification 
The process of decision making implies a comprehensive identification of the most 
relevant attributes of information, learning how to order the available alternatives and 
classifying them (see [1], [16]) with a maximum degree of coherence.  Stressing the 
importance of a comparative analysis, a decision making process is here called a 
learning process if and only if rectification of preferences is possible.  Rectification is 
then understood as the reconstruction of a preferential order for a finite set of alterna-
tives, where it may be necessary an expansion (composition), or on the contrary, a 
contraction (decomposition) of viewpoints. 
When any pair of alternatives is compared and a preference relation is constructed, 
an order is assigned over S A⊆  according to certain viewpoint h.  Following the 
idea that a viewpoint may have multiple extensions so a preferred outcome may at last 
be found [13], the decision maker has to be able to rectify along the sequential learn-
ing process. Such learning process is here characterized as the elicitation of knowl-
edge from single attributes of information, where these attributes are identified step 
by step.  In this way, the most relevant attributes can change and viewpoints may need 
modification (combined, contracted or enlarged).   
The sequential learning process described above needs to take into account its 
natural ambiguity or degree of ignorance.  Let us take for example two viewpoints h 
and v.  If we compare two alternatives a, b under both viewpoints, and the intensity of 
the predicate “a is at least as good as b under viewpoint h”, Rh(a,b),  is stronger than 
the intensity of Rv(a,b), then we are less certain about the value of R(a,b) when the 
viewpoint v is used than when h is used.  This means that v is more ambiguous than h.   
Following [26], [27], we can measure if there is a possibility that Rv(a,b) is true 
given that we know Rh(a,b).  This possibility measure (see [6], [27]),   
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , max ,h v wR a b R a b R a bρ =  
expresses the degree of intersection between h and v, where w h v= ∧ .  Analo-
gously, we can measure if there is a possibility that ( ),vR a b− , where R-(x)=Rc(x)=1-
R(x), is true given that we know Rh(a,b).  The measure of certainty [27] (also called 
measure of necessity [6])  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,, 1 ,h hv vR a b R a bR a b R a bς ρ −= −  
expresses the degree of inclusion of h in v.  In addition,   
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ,, , ,h h hv v vR a b R a b R a bR a b R a b R a bυ ρ ς= −  
is an ambiguity measure as defined in A1-A3 (see [24]), where the greater that υ  is, 
the more ambiguity or uncertainty due to ignorance exists. In this way, when ambigu-
ity on viewpoint h is large, a greater possibility exists for rectifying over the current 
order given by Rh(a,b).  This measure helps to identify when some preference order 
rests upon a viewpoint with a low degree of confidence.  A new viewpoint that takes 
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into consideration other attributes, second order characteristics, can be necessary for a 
robust decision process to take place. 
Now, if we want to assign a greater value of confidence to the viewpoint with a 
greater degree of truth, we need a measure of confidence, dual of uncertainty (due to 
ignorance), such that a greater value can be assigned to the outcome that uses infor-
mation with a higher intensity of certainty.  The idea is to find a measure that explic-
itly assigns, by a comparative analysis, a greater value if a high level of confidence 
exists.  Such a measure, closely related to ambiguity as it has been examined above, 
will directly distinguish the agent’s states of knowledge, by a confidence scale that 
goes from total ignorance to total certainty, based on expert knowledge or maximal 
certainty.  
We then propose that the confidence measure we are looking for can be analyzed 
as a coherence measure.  Recall that ambiguity [8] and coherence measures [20] are 
explicitly related by extension theorems proven for any strong negation (such that a k-
bijection verifying n(x)=k-1(k(1)-k(x)) exists, see [5], [20], [21]).  These coherence 
measures evaluate how fuzzy and similar are any pair of fuzzy sets, where the degree 
of fuzziness is characterized by F1-F3.  For our purposes, the basic idea can be 
phrased as the nearer a fuzzy preference relation is to the sets ∅  or Ω , the higher 
coherence measure is expected.    
Given the referential set X, with ,j iR R X∈ , representing the set of all fuzzy 
preference relations Qf(X) and given a strong negation n on Qf(X), coherence meas-
ures can be then defined over the set of fuzzy preferences: the function 
[ ]: ( ) ( ) 0,1f fQ X Q Xζ × →  is a coherence measure, if and only if the following 
three axioms are satisfied (see [20], [21]): 
C1. ( ) ( ), ,i j j iR R R Rζ ζ=   
C2. ( )( ) ( )( ), ,i j j iR n R n R Rζ ζ=   
C3. ( , ) 0Xζ ∅ =   
The first condition (C1) states the symmetry of this measure and the third one (C3) 
guarantees minimum coherence. About (C2), analyzing the relation between ambigu-
ity and coherence measures, we can see a complementary approach between A2 and 
C2 in the sense that the coherence between Ri and jR
−
 is the opposite of the existing 
one between Ri and Rj.  Remind that if we want to assign a greater value of confidence 
to the viewpoint with a greater degree of truth, we need some measure of confidence, 
something like the dual of ambiguity.  Therefore, coherence is here understood as a 
comparative confidence measure for any pair of fuzzy sets, in our case preference 
relations, such that a common link between fuzzy preference relations can be identi-
fied for any viewpoint. 
Let us recall the above ambiguity measure ( )x yυ , taking x=Rh(a,b)  
and y=Rv(a,b).  If ambiguity is represented by the difference between possibility and 
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necessity measures, then confidence should take into account the aggregated weight 
of these two measures.  And examining confidence as here presented, we can pursue a 
coherence measure close to  
( )1
2
x yυ−
.      (2) 
Therefore, if ( ) ( ) ( )x x xy y yυ ρ ς= −  and ( ) ( )max ,x y x yρ =  and 
( ) ( )1 max , cx y x yς = − , then ( ) ( ) ( )max , max , 1cx y x y x yυ = + − .  Condi-
tion C1 requires that the measure is symmetric, but it can be seen that for the neces-
sity measure the order of the arguments does matter.  In other words, the degree of 
inclusion of x in y is not the same as the degree of inclusion of y in x: 
( ) ( )1 max , 1 max ,c cx y y x− ≠ − .  For this reason, because coherence is con-
ceived as a relation defined over pairs of fuzzy sets, the max function can be replaced 
by some kind of distance representing how far is each set from any other one.   
If we take for example the Euclidian distance 
1
1( , )
m
i i
i
d x y x y
m
=
= ⋅ −∑ , the 
measure defined by (2), where ( ),d x y  and ( ), cd x y  represent a separation degree 
between x and y and between x and everything not being y, respectively, becomes 
( ) ( )1 , ,( , )
2
cd x y d x y
x yβ + −= .   (3) 
Coherence of fuzzy preferences, as defined by C1-C3 and (3), has been initially ex-
plored in [11] (the origin of (3) as a coherence measure is founded in [20]), establish-
ing a possible criterion where all outcomes can be evaluated.  This proposal is useful 
for any viewpoint, offering relevant information about the importance of its prefer-
ences, according to the confidence on their truth values.  In order to maintain coher-
ence along the learning process, this coherence criterion allows the decision agent to 
add an extra dimension to the outcome space of a given viewpoint (see example 1 
below), and it can also be used to examine the degree of coherence between different 
viewpoints so the possibility of combining, contracting or enlarging them can be stud-
ied (see example 2 below).   
 
Example 1. Under the state of knowledge of uncertainty because of ignorance, the 
coherence criterion enables the decision agent to assign an ordinal value over the set 
of alternatives, judging the set of constructed preferences against one certain relation 
R*, which stands as an organizing predicate [23] and denotes maximal certainty or 
expert knowledge. Given the existence of such a predicate, there exists an associated 
coherence criterion for any viewpoint, establishing an independent dimension where 
the outcome space can be coherently organized.   
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Consider the set of preference relations Rh under viewpoint h such that a decision 
agent is interested in identifying weak preference with a greater degree of confidence 
(case where it is difficult to differentiate strict preference from indifference). There-
fore, for any preference relation where the components p and i have simultaneously 
high membership intensities, a higher degree of coherence, as defined by C1-C3, will 
be assigned to it.  In order to apply the coherence criterion we use an organizing 
predicate R* such as R*={1,0,1,0}.  As it can be seen, R* represents the most certain 
knowledge for the values defined by (1). 
Now, consider the following fuzzy preference relations: 
Rh(x,y)={0.5,0.5,0.5,0.0}  
Rh(w,z)={0.9,0.8,0.8,0.1}  
Rh(u,z)={0.2,0.2,0.9,0.7}  
This set of preferences reveals some uncertainty due to ignorance and notice that there 
is not a complete order between them. Comparison of preference is missing between 
alternatives (x,z). Through a third element it would be possible now to examine how 
these alternatives relate with each other.  According to the coherence criterion (3), the 
corresponding confidence-ordinal values over these set of fuzzy preferences relations 
under viewpoint h are: 
β(Rh(x,y),R*)=0.625 
β(Rh(w,z),R*)=0.70  
β(Rh(u,z),R*)=0.55  
In this case, the optimal outcome is Rh(w,z), because it has a greater coherence meas-
ure than all the others.  The coherence criterion, which is here presented as a dimen-
sion where preferences may be organized according to the degree of confidence on 
their truth values, identifies the fuzzy preference relation with the strongest intensity 
and certainty. 
Example 2. Let's consider three viewpoints , ,h v w H∈  over the same set of alter-
natives ,a b A∈ , such that both a, b are members of hS , vS  and wS .  Remember 
that we say that a process of rectification is possible when two or more viewpoints are 
candidates for ordering the same set of alternatives.  In this case h v wS S S= = , so if 
an intelligent agent rectifies then his viewpoint changes.  For this reason some deci-
sion aid is necessary for the agent to identify the optimal viewpoint to be used, based 
in his beliefs but also on the confidence (over his state of knowledge) that the set of 
preferences reveal.  The viewpoint may change, but maximum coherence needs to be 
preserved. 
Assume the agent believes viewpoint h is the most important, but when evaluating pref-
erence between a and b under h, confidence in its outcome suffers of some ambiguity.  
This can be caused by many reasons, for example, if h is composed by price-quantity 
criteria, the agent may suffer from lack of perfect knowledge over price stability.  So, if 
the agent is comparing different goods, he can also reveal his preferences under view-
point v, composed by fair-trade attributes, and viewpoint w, which values presentation 
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and marketing.  The agent will then have to decide and the viewpoint he uses will de-
termine the final outcome, which has to be an optimal answer to his necessities.  
Consider the following preferences, 
Rh(a,b)={0.7,0.3,0.5,0.3}  
Rv(a,b)={0.2,0.8,0.2,0.4}  
Rw(a,b)={0.9,0.2,0.9,0.1} 
If the agent wants to choose the most certain viewpoint, such that alternative a is at 
least as good as alternative b with maximum certainty, he can use the same organizing 
predicate R* defined in example 1. Otherwise, a confidence order can be constructed 
between viewpoints h, v and w so the possibility of merging viewpoints, due to their 
relative coherence, can be examined. Using the coherence measure defined in (3): 
 
β(Rh,R*)=0.65 β(h,v)=0.425 
β(Rv,R*)=0.30 β(h,w)=0.65 
β(Rw,R*)=0.875  β(v,w)=0.30 
As a result, the optimal outcome according to R* is given by viewpoint w and the 
agent will find reasons to rectify.  In the other case and complementary to the situa-
tion just described, the decision maker will be also motivated to combine viewpoints 
h and w, in order to find a new enlarged viewpoint where the decision maker can be 
more certain about his/her knowledge and preferences.  
5   Final Comments 
A complete fuzzy preference structure has been considered for decision making, char-
acterized as a learning process, where preference relations need to be successively 
assigned over a set of alternatives, always allowing revision and rectification of be-
liefs. An analytical framework has been set for studying preference construction and 
the identification of an optimal outcome under characterizing viewpoints.  
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